All but seven of the remaining South Korean workers at the only joint venture with the North have returned home.

The Unification Ministry in Seoul says five people, including the chairman of the Gaeseong Industrial Development Management Committee, plus two telecommunications company employees will remain in the zone to negotiate “unresolved issues.”

North East Asia Deputy Project Director, Daniel Pinkston, joined Arirang News to give an analysis of the current situation.

North Korea has moved at least one midrange missile to its east coast for a possible test firing and may launch others. In this video, Crisis Group’s Daniel Pinkston speaks to the Wall Street Journal about what North Korea hopes to gain by escalating tensions.

PHOTO: Uriminzokkiri

After five days of restricting access to the inter-Korean Kaesŏng Industrial Complex (KIC), Pyongyang ordered suspension of operations pending a review on the future of the project. KIC was established in accordance with an agreement reached during the June 2000 inter-Korean summit and remains one of the few symbols of inter-Korean cooperation. The project is home to 123 South Korean firms that employ about 53,000 North Korean workers who produce labour-intensive manufactured goods that are losing competitiveness in South Korea’s increasingly high-wage economy. For Pyongyang, KIC is an important source of hard currency, given that both the country’s export competitiveness and its foreign-exchange sources are very limited.

The North Korean government receives about $90 million per year for KIC labour services, but workers see only a portion of this, which they receive in North Korean wŏn at the official exchange rate. Former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and supporters of the “sunshine policy” envisioned that KIC would be a transformative project that would draw North Korea out of its isolation. It offered an opportunity for North Koreans to see the subversive reality of an alternative economic system; this was in turn expected to encourage reform and opening. Instead, North Korea has operated KIC as if it were a hermetically sealed space station. South Korea has supplied electricity, water and waste-water treatment, heating oil, construction materials, and components and material inputs for the manufactures. The only things North Korea has supplied are the land and labour.

Given that the North succeeded in sealing off KIC, why would the Pyongyang leadership now risk losing it? There are two possibilities, neither of which is reassuring for the future of the Korean peninsula.

The first possibility is that Pyongyang is using KIC in a larger coercive bargaining game with the rest of the world over North Korea becoming a “nuclear state”. The North Korean leadership would be willing to risk KIC in this game precisely because KIC is valuable. Risking something valuable is not irrational when used to signal the importance of what is at stake in a coercive bargaining game. Pyongyang could be saying, “look, we are so serious that we will take costly measures for you and us, unless you acquiesce”.  The closing of KIC could be an indicator of how high Pyongyang really believes the stakes are in its confrontation with the rest of the world over possession of nuclear weapons.

The second possible reason could be internal regime stability. This would be even more ominous than the external coercive bargaining outlined above. All dictators must provide material incentives to build and maintain a coalition of supporters if they wish to remain in power. Kim Jong-un has been playing the dictator game by providing material rewards and rent-seeking opportunities over the last year; reports have circulated about property rights being wrested from the old guard and provided to the next generation of Kim supporters in a classic round of purges. The North Korean leadership could be planning to expropriate KIC from South Korean firms and transfer the factories to a North Korean entity, providing new spoils for Kim to distribute to his loyalists.

This second possibility is actually the more worrying one. In bargaining over nuclear weapons with the international community, Pyongyang would have an easier time backing down once the game runs its course. But if Pyongyang is expropriating KIC to maintain regime cohesion, it could be a sign that the leadership is taking a very risky move to head off potential internal instability. This could mean that the coalition is fragile and rent-seeking opportunities could be shrinking as North Korea’s “military first” orientation is hitting a dead end. There would be no way to prevent the expropriation, but with KIC separated from its South Korean management and materials inputs, it will be an almost useless asset. The expropriation would be doomed to fail in meeting its internal political goal, and the danger of instability would only increase.

In this episode of the Korea Today show, Dan Pinkston, North East Asia Deputy Project Director, speaks about the current stand off between the two Koreas (Dan Pinkston is interviewed in this video at 15:10).

North Korea has taken a number of recent steps that raise the risks of miscalculation, inadvertent escalation and deadly conflict on the Korean peninsula. On 12 December, it launched a small satellite into orbit in defiance of UN Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718 and 1874. The Council condemned this in Resolution 2087 (22 January). Three weeks later, Pyongyang conducted its third underground nuclear explosion. In response, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2094 (7 March) condemning the test and expanding economic sanctions. This was preceded by multiple vitriolic threats from the North. While none of this is unprecedented, the danger of unintended consequences has increased considerably. All sides need to issue more reassuring statements, exercise caution during planned military exercises and, especially, the North must avoid further blatant disregard of its international obligations.

The North’s threats had slight nuances and different audiences. The military’s main target was the U.S-South Korea alliance and the UN Command (UNC) as they begin large combined exercises in the South. It declared the Security Council actions hostile and the annual U.S.-South Korean combined military exercises “the most dangerous nuclear war manoeuvres targeted against the [North]“. The North’s army said it would take practical (but undefined) counter-actions, no longer recognise the 1953 Korean War Armistice as of 11 March, shut down operations at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjŏm and cut off the telephone line to the UNC. The televised statement also declared that all armed forces, including reserves and the Strategic Rocket Forces, were prepared to act according to an “operational plan signed by Kim Jŏng-ŭn” and that the army was ready to counter even a nuclear attack with a “diversified precision nuclear strike of Korean style”.

The foreign ministry’s statement was aimed at the Security Council and particularly the U.S. and South Korea, currently a Council member. While mostly repetitive, confusion was caused by the headline accompanying the official news agency’s English version: “Second Korean War Is Unavoidable: DPRK FM Spokesman”. The Korean could be better (if a little tortuously) translated: “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman’s Clarification of the Extreme Hardline Position Related to the Current Situation whereby a Second Korean War is Difficult to Avoid”. The statement declared that “if the Americans light the fuse of a nuclear war, the revolutionary forces will exercise the right to execute a preemptive nuclear attack against the headquarters of the invaders”. World media reported this as threatening a preemptive nuclear strike against the U.S., but it should be interpreted to mean the North is prepared to retaliate with nuclear weapons against a conventional military attack from the UNC in Seoul.

The foreign ministry’s message was that sanctions will not work, pressure is counterproductive, and the world should recognise the North as a nuclear weapons state. Pyongyang was displeased with China’s support of 2094 and is also trying to signal that the regional security important to Beijing’s development goals will suffer if it implements the sanctions. Meanwhile, the North’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea issued a statement renouncing all inter-Korean non-aggression agreements, including the 1992 “Basic Agreement” and the Korean War Armistice, and declaring that the inter-Korean Red Cross liaison office at Panmunjŏm would be closed. The target audience was South Korea, aiming to challenge new President Park Geun-hye and undermine domestic support for the U.S. alliance.

The rhetoric was matched in the South. On 6 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesman said, more assertively than ever before, that Seoul would respond strongly to provocation, not only directly but also at the command leadership. The defence minister nominee said the South was prepared for every military contingency, including all-out war to topple the Pyongyang regime.

The North’s measures are partly timed to coincide with annual major military exercises in South Korea. Foal Eagle, a joint and combined U.S.-South Korea field exercise (1 March-30 April) includes about 10,000 U.S. troops, mostly from outside the peninsula. Key Resolve (11-21 March) includes some 3,000 from the U.S. and South Korea and a few from the UK, Australia, Canada, Colombia and Denmark. Swedish and Swiss representatives from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are monitoring armistice compliance. The UNC notified the North on 21 February, but Pyongyang always declines invitations to observe. These coincide with large joint exercises in the North. Pyongyang has declared sea/air exclusion zones on both coasts expected to last until the end of March. These zones and reports of mobile missile deployments indicate a possible live-fire missile test.

This is the seventh North Korean renunciation of the 1953 armistice. If it is no longer in force, it means a formal return to war-time conditions but not that an attack is imminent. However, it raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation of incidents. There would be no written agreement constraining either side from new military operations, such as the North’s three statements threatened.

Pyongyang is signaling willingness to accept high risks apparently in belief it has greater resolve than South Korea, the U.S. and the international community. It is trying to respond to condemnation with its own pressure in the hope Seoul, Washington, Beijing and others will tire of heightened tensions, especially if the situation begins to undermine the international economy. The leadership, since it does not face the same accountability as the democratic South, might possibly feel it has an advantage in a game of brinksmanship. There are also two trip wires that would warn it of going too far or that an attack against the North was in preparation: roughly 700 South Koreans at the Kaesŏng Industrial Complex (KIC) just north of the Military Demarcation Line; and tens of thousand U.S. civilians in South Korea. If major military action were considered imminent, both governments would remove their citizens from harm’s way.

Whatever brinksmanship advantage Pyongyang believes it has is balanced by risks. Military action, even heightened tensions, could damage the North’s already parlous economy, producing unintended consequences for the regime. Following the North’s artillery attack against the South in November 2010, war fears among North Koreans leading to food hoarding and financial upset were reported. The economy is not immune to confidence shocks, especially entering a season of depleted food stocks. Food insecurity is worsened by a steep decline in food aid since the December satellite launch. After its disastrous 2009 currency reform, there were reports of dissent and unprecedented official apologies. Tightening sanctions, worsening food insecurity, and bellicose state behaviour could have negative economic effects that could just possibly impact regime stability and predictability.

Mutual deterrence remains robust, but the threat of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation has risen considerably. In a worst-case scenario, retaliatory responses to an accident during either side’s military exercises or a deliberate military provocation could lead rapidly to war with potential first-day casualties in the hundreds of thousands. Even if further escalation is averted, the North’s actions likely will have negative effects on its economy and worsening food insecurity.

To reduce tensions and restore confidence in crisis management:

• all parties must fulfill in practice their commitments under the 1953 Armistice;
• North Korea should avoid further blatant violation of its international commitments, including under relevant Security Council resolutions; and
• senior U.S. officials, including the president, should both reaffirm that there is no intention to attack the North preemptively and that the U.S. will fulfill its alliance commitments, including robustly against any North Korean military attacks.

In this video interview with The Telegraph, Dan Pinkston, North East Asia Project Deputy Director, says the new threats from North Korea are a result of Pyongyang feeling “emboldened” by recent successful nuclear tests.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un (C), his wife Ri Sol-Ju (L) and former NBA basketball player Dennis Rodman clap during an exhibition basketball game in Pyongyang in this undated picture released by North Korea’s KCNA news agency on March 1, 2013.

The last couple of years have been tough for North Korea watchers seeking new policy prescriptions for dealing with Pyongyang. The Six-Party Talks appear dead and Pyongyang has no consistent and formal diplomatic processes with either Seoul or Washington. Back channel efforts have failed. President Obama fulfilled his promise to reach out to adversaries by sending a secret delegation to Pyongyang twice in 2012, but this effort was rebuffed. The Lee Myung-bak administration also held secret meetings with DPRK officials in October 2009 and June 2011 to seek an inter-Korean summit, but without success.

More recently, former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt led a delegation to Pyongyang in January 2013, but the group was widely criticised for visiting in the wake of the DPRK’s Ŭnha-3 launch the previous month. DPRK media described the delegation as having paid respect to former leaders Kim Il-sŏng and Kim Jŏng-il as great men, and as having recognised the DPRK as a great power in science and technology.

And now basketball genius (I’m not joking) Dennis Rodman, former National Basketball Association (NBA) champion and winner of seven consecutive NBA rebounding titles, has returned from a well-publicised trip to Pyongyang. Rodman was part of a group that included three Harlem Globetrotter players and Vice Media . This group, especially Rodman, is facing severe criticism. Rodman has been denounced for having called Kim Jŏng-ŭn a “friend for life” and an “awesome guy.” Professor Robert Kelly at Pusan National University sums up the view that high profile foreign visitors do a disservice by providing domestic propaganda value that lends credibility to the regime. While I tend to agree with Kelly, I think the Rodman visit is different and opens a window of opportunity to bring change to North Korea.

For there to be change in North Korean thinking, North Koreans first must question the country’s governance, organising principles and sŏn’gun ideology. One way is to encourage information inflows into the country, but radio and television tuners are fixed so they can only receive state broadcasts, and citizens do not have access to the internet or other means of communicating with the outside world. With limited opportunities to expose North Koreans to information that contradicts the state’s narrative and official sŏn’gun ideology, the U.S. government and others should not dismiss outright Dennis Rodman’s suggestion of “basketball diplomacy.” The Rodman visit was very important to the leadership. Kim Jŏng-ŭn snubbed former U.S. presidents and other heads of state, as well as a former high-level U.S. government official and the executive chairman of Google, but Kim turned out for Rodman and appeared giddy as they sat next to each other and watched the game.

The visit, access and North Korean media coverage reflect the importance of sports to the Kim Jŏng-ŭn regime. On 4 November 2012, a Sunday, an “enlarged” Politburo meeting was convened in Pyongyang to establish the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission. Several high-level officials from the party, military and the cabinet were present and the meeting received extensive media coverage. According to KCNA, the Politburo decided:

To put the DPRK on the level of a sports power is an important work to boost the national capabilities in every way, demonstrate the indomitable spirit and dignity of   Sŏn’gun Korea to the whole world and make all service personnel and people push ahead with the building of a thriving socialist nation full of great national pride and self-esteem as the developing revolution requires with a historic turn being effected in accomplishing the revolutionary cause of chuch’e.

The committee is chaired by Chang Sŏng-t’aek, Kim Jŏng-ŭn’s uncle, and aims “to control the overall sports work of the country in a unified manner.” KCNA reported that Kim Il-sŏng “wisely led the work of putting sports on a mass basis, developing sports technique and providing material conditions for it …thereby laying a solid foundation for the development of chuch’e-based physical culture and sports.”

Kim Jŏng-il is also credited with having made a great contribution by “putting culture and sports on a mass basis…as required by the era of sŏn’gun.” As for the party, KCNA reported:

The Workers’ Party of Korea unrolled a far-reaching plan to turn the DPRK, socialist political and military power, into an economic power and sports power, indicated the concrete direction and ways of carrying out the plan, and saw to it that wise measures were taken to bring about a radical change in the physical culture and sports of the country by making the sports wind rage across the country.

Given the state’s sports agenda, it is even easier to criticise the Rodman trip. The Kim regime sees sports as an instrument to increase social control and help achieve a totalitarian unity that is anathema to those who prefer an open and pluralistic society. The North Korean state is unmatched in the realm of social control. There is no civil society. There are extensive, redundant and overlapping institutions for monitoring and surveillance including the neighborhood watch units or inminban (人民班), the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of People’s Security, the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau, and the Defence Security Command. No activities outside the purview of party and state control are tolerated.

The State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission was established as yet another institution to monitor and control the lives of every North Korean and to bring glory to the Kim family regime. To contribute to this agenda is deplorable, and most analysts have interpreted Rodman’s visit in this context. But perhaps the Rodman visit offers an opportunity to deliver a Trojan horse of subversion.

North Korea’s leaders want their system to survive, and any changes they make are intended to strengthen the system, not to reform it. They have learned from Gorbachev’s “mistakes” of seeking political reforms and restructuring to improve the Soviet system. The North Korean leadership apparently views sports exchanges as furthering its own agenda.

However, “basketball diplomacy” could have unintended consequences for the regime, just as Gorbachev’s perestroika did for the USSR and the lifting of travel restrictions did for East Germany. Personal exchanges are probably the best way to expose North Koreans to different types of governance and social organisation, which is the first step in the thought process that results in questioning the regime.

First, the Rodman visit is subversive because the image of Kim Jŏng-ŭn embracing Rodman can be perceived as the leadership tolerating or accepting someone who is different. South Korea’s Daily NK reported that North Koreans in the provinces were stunned to see Kim embracing an American with numerous tattoos and body piercings and likened it to Kim embracing a “goblin or gangster.”

Why not systematize all this with a ‘Basketball Development Foundation’? A few former NBA players could serve on the board, to give it allure. I have no doubt its funding would not prove to be a problem, especially if the institution received an explicit or tacit endorsement from President Obama, which the North Korean leadership also seeks for its commitment to “basketball diplomacy.”

In a short amount of time, this foundation could host basketball development clinics in Pyongyang, but only on the condition that North Korean teams participate in clinics and tournaments outside North Korea as well, and at no cost to North Korea. You want basketball diplomacy? Sure, we’ll fund an all-expenses-paid trip for three weeks for North Korean basketball teams to attend a camp and tournament on the beach at Waikiki. That would give the North Koreans a chance to bow in front of the Duke Kahanamoku statue, and with plenty of kimch’i in Honolulu, they’d feel right at home. Tournaments in Sydney, Vancouver, Hong Kong, Manila, etc., could be held. I would even suggest a game at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjŏm between a KPA team and other national military teams, along with a game featuring mixed teams and players from the North Korean national team and NBA players like LeBron James and Kobe Bryant. If Kim Jŏng-ŭn wants basketball diplomacy, I say, “Bring it!”

Once Kim Jŏng-ŭn makes a strategic decision to return to real diplomacy, abandon sŏn’gun, and embark on denuclearisation, President Obama can call Kim to discuss the details of the annual Obama-Kim Basketball Tournament for Peace. Just as ping-pong diplomacy helped thaw relations between the U.S and China in the 1970s, basketball diplomacy, with appropriate implementation, could help thaw relations between the U.S and North Korea.

Sign reads “Let’s fight to the death for the party central committee led by the great comrade Kim Jung-un.” PHOTO: CRISISGROUP/Dan Pinkston

As expected, the DPRK has rejected UN Security Council Resolution 2087 adopted 22 January (EST) in response to the launch of the Ŭnha-3 space launch vehicle (SLV) on 12 December 2012. The DPRK Foreign Ministry statement dismissed the resolution as illegitimate less than two hours after it was adopted by the Security Council. The DPRK National Defense Commission (NDC) issued its own statement the following day, threatening to launch more satellite boosters and missiles, and to conduct nuclear tests in order to deal with the United States. Not to be outdone, the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea issued its own statement against the ROK one day after the NDC, promising to wage war against the South if it participates in the sanctions regime against Pyongyang.

The DPRK’s displeasure with Resolution 2087 may have been expected, but Pyongyang’s belligerent tone caught many by surprise, as the expectation had been that North Korea would moderate its behaviour following the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011. For a year we have seen reports of Kim Jŏng-ŭn’s leadership style and how it contrasted with his father’s. Kim Jong-il was a relative recluse whose spoken words were never broadcast on radio or television. Kim only spoke once before the public when he uttered one sentence at the beginning of a military parade in the early 1990s.

In contrast, Kim Jŏng-ŭn projects the charismatic image of a natural politician that often is compared to that of his grandfather. He appears to be a confident, modern man who is more energetic in managing state affairs than his father who was in declining health the last few years of his life. The contrasting styles led some people to believe that opening and reform were imminent.

Despite cosmetic changes and the construction of a new leadership coalition, the North Korean system is a highly centralised dictatorship. The institutional structures and state ideology remain fundamentally unchanged. In terms of foreign policy, national security policy, and inter-Korean policy, Pyongyang has not changed at all. The Korean Workers Party, the state, the Korean People’s Army, and the leader, Kim Jŏng-ŭn, remain committed to the strategy, or ideology, of son’gun, or “military first.” DPRK institutions and media repeatedly affirm that they must continue fighting the revolution until final victory, namely national unification under Marshal Kim Jŏng-ŭn.

Son’gun makes the international system appear menacing and intent on domination. According to son’gun, the American imperialist “bastards” seek to enslave Koreans and anyone else without the means to resist. The only way to avoid this catastrophe is to acquire the military capabilities to deter the wicked United States along with any of their flunkeys that might join a U.S.-led coalition. In sum, it is a mixture of Leninist imperialism and realist power balancing, except it is more militant than the sum of these two parts.

In contrast, the rest of the world takes a legalistic, neo-liberal approach to international affairs, assuming that states are rational actors who seek to maximize their gains as they weigh the costs and benefits of their actions. This logic, which forms the foundation of economic sanctions, tells us that states will reverse course if increasing costs make a given action unsustainable. This thinking has led many to believe that China holds the key to taming North Korea’s missile and nuclear ambitions given Pyongyang’s economic dependence upon Beijing. Once the Chinese really get angry and cut them off economically,Pyongyang will cease its provocative behaviour, or so they say.

The problem is North Korean decision-makers do not follow this logic. The North Korean leadership formulates its decisions according to son’gun. They know the international community will impose costs for developing long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. But the North Korean leadership does not consider the opportunity costs of their actions, or the benefits they could obtain through international cooperation.

From Pyongyang’s perspective, Resolution 2087 validates the truth and importance of son’gun. The DPRK sees international law, international institutions, collective security, arms control and any other cooperative arrangement as undesirable and as schemes to undermine their national security. A son’gun leader is one who sees power as the only instrument in politics—at both the domestic and international levels. In the son’gun mindset, power is the real currency of the international system. Power—not international cooperation—enables a state to achieve its goals. Power is not only critical to son’gun politics, power is the only thing in son’gun politics. Without superior capabilities, a son’gun leader is at a loss. He cannot build coalitions or institutions to create mutual benefits for a pluralistic community. Every interaction is a zero-sum game driven by top-down power asymmetries. So he must seek power to survive at a minimum and then pursue other goals when sufficient power resources are at hand.

Some analysts have described Resolution 2087 as restrained and calibrated. No new sanctions instruments were included, but it added entities and individuals to the sanctions list, including the Korean Committee for Space Technology, and two senior officials implicated in the Ŭnha-3 launches in April and December last year. While critics view this as weak and insufficient, Pyongyang sees it in essence as a show trial that unjustly accused, tried and convicted their national heroes as international criminals. In this case, son’gun mandates a strong response, so additional missile tests and a nuclear test are almost certain, just as the NDC has promised.

So what to do about this? The good news is that the son’gun leadership is so obsessed with power that they understand the power balance, particularly when it is not in their favour. Of course, international diplomacy should never cease. The diplomatic corps should continue their efforts to find compromises and ways to slow down, freeze or reverse North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs. However, this is not a substitute for a robust deterrent posture.South Korea and its treaty ally the United States, along with coalition partners in the United Nations Command, should be prepared for any contingency—however unpleasant—on the Korean peninsula.

The Unha-3 (Milky Way 3) rocket carrying the second version of Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite, is launched at West Sea Satellite Launch Site in Cholsan county, North Pyongan province, December 12, 2012. PHOTO: REUTERS/KCNA

North Korea has beaten its South Korean rival in the race to place a satellite into earth orbit, becoming the 10^th nation to do so. Despite this impressive scientific and engineering achievement, the launch violates UN Security Council resolutions that prohibit all North Korean launches using ballistic technologies. Pyongyang argues that as a signatory to the Outer Space Treaty it has the sovereign right to launch satellites because Article 1 stipulates that “outer space…shall be free for exploration and use by all states without discrimination of any kind…” However, Pyongyang conveniently ignores the section of Article 1 that requires states to explore space “in accordance with international law.” UN Security Council resolutions are considered international law, and the Outer Space Treaty does not authorize signatories to disregard or violate resolutions as they exercise their right to explore outer space.

North Korea’s Ŭnha-3 space launch vehicle uses ballistic missile technology that inherently is dual use; it has both peaceful and military applications that are difficult or impossible to separate. All states, including North Korea, have legitimate national interests in the peaceful use of satellites, but Pyongyang’s satellite launch was achieved in a very unorthodox manner. Countries generally pursue space access through cooperative agreements to obtain data and access to satellites before considering the development of a space launch vehicle, which is very difficult and expensive. For example, South Korea began building satellites in the early 1990s and several have been launched transparently with other nations’ rockets for commercial and scientific purposes. However, Pyongyang focused on rocket development first and then satellites, almost as an afterthought.

North Korea’s past belligerence and non-compliance with its international commitments, including the withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and two nuclear tests, has led the UN Security Council to determine that all North Korean launches using ballistic missile technology pose a threat to international peace and security. Pyongyang has made clear it disagrees with this view and that it has the sovereign right to launch satellites, so it continues to defy the Security Council.

While Pyongyang celebrates, the international community has expressed outrage and promised there will be consequences. North Korea’s neighbors, including China, are not happy with the satellite launch, and they likely will take unilateral and multilateral actions to punish Pyongyang for another transgression. The measures will be designed to raise the costs for North Korea to continue on this course with the expectation that if these costs are sufficiently high and that if a mutually acceptable deal could be arranged, North Korea could be persuaded to abandon its nuclear and missile programs given their tremendous opportunity costs.

This approach is based upon a legalistic, contractual, neo-liberal institutional paradigm that assumes rationality and utilitarian calculations whereby states respond to material incentives. The challenge lies in crafting the right package of positive incentives such as aid and security assurances along with negative incentives such as economic sanctions to influence state behavior. Diplomats are tasked with designing a package of mutually acceptable incentives, and then leaders must sell the agreement to their domestic constituencies and somehow signal a credible commitment to the other country’s leadership. Of course, these are very basic concepts for those who have studied international relations or practiced diplomacy around the world.

This approach has been tried with North Korea for at least two decades, but with little success. And now North Korea is one step closer to developing a nuclear ICBM capability, albeit they have many more steps to go. The satellite launch now forces the international community to revisit North Korean transgressions and many will agonize over lost opportunities to denuclearize North Korea and the challenges ahead. The Chinese blame Americans and the Americans blame Chinese. Opposition and ruling parties in South Korea and the U.S. blame each other for policy failures and “getting North Korea wrong.” Diplomats are warning that North Korea will become “more isolated” unless it changes its behavior, which is diplomatic jargon for “we are prepared to impose costs on Pyongyang through sanctions.”

The problem with this approach is that Pyongyang is playing a different game and the leadership is motivated by different values. The North Korean leadership views the world through the lens of sŏn’gun, or “military first.” Almost all foreigners fail to understand the implications of sŏn’gun for North Korean foreign policy, and consequently, what policies are needed in response. They tend to think it means the military has gained prominence in policy making and therefore North Korean foreign policy is “hard line.” While generally correct, this perspective adheres to the Western contractual and institutional approach mentioned above, and it misses the fundamental guiding principles of sŏn’gun, which ultimately drives North Korean decision-making.

Western diplomats and negotiators seek to assess North Korean intentions and preferences through various means, but how many of them have read a single Korean book or article on  sŏn’gun ideology and its view of foreign relations? We must remember that the North Korean leadership did not attend foreign universities to learn the virtues of confidence building measures and neo-liberal institutionalism. They attended schools such as Kim Il Sung University, Kim Chaek University, and the Kim Il Sung Military Academy—not UC San Diego, Tufts, Georgetown, Stanford, and Oxford.

The world according to sŏn’gun ideology is an extremely menacing one. Sŏn’gun borrows extensively from Lenin’s perspective on “capitalist imperialism” except that sŏn’gun is more extreme. It does retain Marx’s labor theory of value and the concept of capitalist exploitation of workers and capitalist accumulation of surplus value. However, it abandons Marxist-Leninist class-based universalism and instead upholds the nation-state as the unit of analysis in international relations. Sŏn’gun is extremely nationalistic and extols Korean exceptionalism. The capitalist core state—presently the United States, and previously Japan during the colonial period—is exploitative by definition. But this perspective is even more radical than Lenin’s. The core capitalist country doesn’t just seek greater returns to capital abroad, but according to sŏn’gun, the United States is hell bent on enslaving the Korean people.

The North Korean sŏn’gun literature repeatedly warns of enslavement if the nation fails to acquire and maintain sufficient military power to resist enslaving imperialism. This explains North Korea’s obsession with the need for the United States to “abandon its hostile policy towards the DPRK.” However, there is no negative security assurance by the United States that could ever be credible. If one could be credible, it would falsify sŏn’gun. For a North Korean to suggest that a package of U.S. incentives could be acceptable and in North Korea’s national interest would mean he or she is renouncing sŏn’gun. For those educated and indoctrinated in North Korea such thoughts are inconceivable, and if they were expressed it would almost certainly lead to extreme retribution for that person and his or her family.

Foreign relations according to sŏn’gun are based upon power. This aspect of sŏn’gun ideology clearly resonates with the realist school in international relations. The sŏn’gun literature ridicules international law, international institutions, mutual restraint, confidence building, arms control, and collective security as tricks to disarm and enslave North Korea. If you’re skeptical, just look to Iraq, Libya, and Syria as prime examples that validate sŏn’gun in the minds of the North Korean leadership.

In sum, Pyongyang must abandon its sŏn’gun ideology and its hostile world view before any negotiated diplomatic settlement can be struck to end North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. No amount of sanctions or extent of “isolation” can raise the costs sufficiently to persuade North Korea’s sŏn’gun leadership to make a “strategic decision” to denuclearize and embark on a path of greater prosperity for the North Korean people. Until Pyongyang abandons its sŏn’gun foreign policy, the international community has little choice but to stress deterrence, containment, nonproliferation, export controls, and counter-proliferation. Fortunately, the North Korean leadership clearly understands power and they can be deterred. Diplomacy should not be abandoned. It must continue to assess North Korea’s intentions and goals, and efforts be made to slow down or freeze Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs whenever possible. However, the international community should not harbor any illusions about the prospects for negotiations with sŏn’gun Korea.

Naro-1 space launch vehicle. Photos: Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI)

During a recent visit to Beijing, I was reminded that many Chinese believe the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances are aimed at containing China. My Chinese friends also confirmed what I’ve been reading: there appears to be a growing perception that the United States benefits from rising tensions in East Asia. I find this Chinese perspective quite puzzling. Although some cynical critics of the U.S. “military-industrial complex” stress that certain defense firms are poised to boost revenues through increased arms sales to the region, the threat of an armed conflict in the region puts much greater national economic benefits at risk. I do not believe rising tension in East Asia is in the U.S. national interest, and I do not believe it is welcomed or encouraged by senior American government officials.

Many Chinese analysts believe the U.S. encouraged or pushed South Korea to adopt the New Missile Guidelines (NMG) that extend the maximum range of its ballistic missiles to 800km with a 500kg payload. The extended missile range fits the Chinese narrative regarding the U.S. “pivot” or “re-balancing” to East Asia, which generally is described as a military build-up that could become an obstacle to China’s peaceful rise and the restoration of China’s rightful position following a century of humiliation and turmoil. Granted, Washington’s announcement of its pivot strategy coincided with an increase of maritime disputes in the region, but South Korea’s NMG should not be perceived as being aimed at China.

The evidence and facts behind the U.S-ROK missile talks reveal a contentious dialogue on topics of divergent interests—not a harmonious coordination of identical policy positions. Some Chinese friends told me “the U.S. could have stopped South Korea from adopting the new missile guidelines.” I suppose they are correct, but it would have been at a tremendous cost to the U.S.-ROK bilateral relationship. Once the ROK decided it would issue the NMG, it was in the interest of both Seoul and Washington to close ranks and project a unified position, which is part of smart management in strong and mature alliances.

Naro-1 space launch vehicle. Photos: Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI)

Divergent Interests and Contentious Issues

As mentioned in a previous blog entry, South Korea has been interested in extended ballistic missile ranges since the early 1990s when North Korea was testing its medium-range Nodong. U.S.-ROK bilateral missile talks began in 1995 and the U.S. consistently declined South Korean requests to extend ROK missile ranges beyond Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. So why would Washington’s position suddenly change in 2012? Granted, some Chinese analysts believe the ROK’s new missile guidelines are aimed at the DPRK, but others believe the U.S. “pivot” is driving Washington to goad its allies into providing more resources in the big power game of containing China.

An alternative explanation is that U.S. and ROK interests diverged to some degree, and South Korea’s NMG was a compromise solution that avoided even worse outcomes. For example, the ROK initially requested an extended ballistic missile range of at least 1,000km. Some conservative activist groups such as the People for the Restoration of Missile Sovereignty (미사일 主權 回復을 위한 市民모임) and the Patriotism Alliance (愛國主義連帶) believe there should be no range or payload restrictions at all.

Many U.S. military planners welcome additional alliance assets in the context of managing security on the peninsula and deterring North Korea, or defeating the DPRK in a war in case deterrence fails. However, the U.S. adamantly opposed unlimited ROK missile ranges that would have broad implications for the whole region. Furthermore, the issue of solid fuel was not addressed in the talks leading up to the NMG announcement in October, much to the dismay of South Korea.

The 1979 U.S.-ROK missile agreement also addressed solid rocket propellants, which were used in the Paekkom and Hyŏnmu systems. Apparently, that part of the agreement is still in force, which at least partially explains why the 1979 agreement has not been disclosed to the public even though it was revised when South Korea joined the MTCR in 2001.

Naro-1 space launch vehicle. Photos: Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI)

South Korea for years has been bristling about the solid rocket fuel restrictions under the 1979 agreement and how it has hindered ROK space launch vehicle (SLV) development. The military advantage of solid propellants is that they are relatively stable, which means they can be used in mobile missile systems and solid-fuel missiles require a much shorter launch preparation time. The down side is that once solid fuels are ignited, the burn cannot be stopped and this makes flight control more difficult. However, solid fuels have a higher thrust density, which means rocket booster requires less volume for an equivalent of delivered thrust.

Apparently, the 1979 agreement limited the total thrust impulse to one million pounds-second, or one million pound*seconds. The solid-fuel KSR-I sounding rocket flight-tested in 1993 produced about 19,500 lbs thrust for 25 seconds, or about 487,500lbs*seconds, which is just under half of the permissible limit. The two-stage solid fuel KSR-II flight-tested in 1997 and 1998 had about the maximum permitted total thrust impulse of one million lbs*seconds. However, the KSR-II, which was 11.1 meters long and weighed two tons, carried a 150kg payload to an altitude of 137.2km. Obviously, this is insufficient to launch a satellite into earth orbit.

Most modern SLVs use both liquid and solid fuel boosters, and the ROK is looking to utilize solid propellants in future Korean SLVs. However, solid rocket propellants were not covered in the talks leading up to the NMG, and the two sides agreed to defer the talks and relegate the solid fuel issue to other government agencies. The U.S. is concerned about the proliferation of missile technologies and Washington wants to see a strong commitment from Seoul to forgo long-range missile development in addition to strict compliance with MTCR export controls.

The Lee government felt pressured to respond to North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile threats, and it had public support to walk away from the MTCR in order to “regain missile sovereignty.” There have also been pressures within the government and conservative groups to retaliate for the 2010 attacks against the Ch’ŏnan military vessel and Yŏnp’yŏng Island, so the New Missile Guidelines are not as bad as some possible alternative measures. The NMG could be offered as a bargaining chip if North Korea decides to engage in serious arms control, and South Korea remains committed to MTCR export control guidelines.

Thanks to Michael Elleman for technical advice and comments.